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The Robust Price of Anarchy of Altruistic Games
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Abstract
We study the inefficiency of equilibria for various classes of games when players are (partially) altru-
istic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i’s perceived cost is a convex combination
of 1 − αi times his direct cost and αi times the social cost. Tuning the parameters αi allows smooth
interpolation between purely selfish and purely altruistic behavior. Within this framework, we study
altruistic extensions of linear congestion games, fair cost-sharing games and valid utility games.
We derive (tight) bounds on the price of anarchy of these games for several solution concepts. Thereto,
we suitably adapt the smoothness notion introduced by Roughgarden and show that it captures the
essential properties to determine the robust price of anarchy of these games. Our bounds show that for
congestion games and cost-sharing games, the worst-case robust price of anarchy increases with increasing
altruism, while for valid utility games, it remains constant and is not affected by altruism. However, the
increase in the price of anarchy is not a universal phenomenon: for symmetric singleton linear congestion
games, we derive a bound on the pure price of anarchy that decreases as the level of altruism increases.
Since the bound is also strictly lower than the robust price of anarchy, it exhibits a natural example in
which Nash equilibria are more efficient than more permissive notions of equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Many large-scale decentralized systems, such as infrastructure investments or traffic on roads or computer
networks, bring together large numbers of individuals with different and oftentimes competing objectives.
When these individuals choose actions to benefit themselves, the result is frequently suboptimal for society
as a whole. This basic insight has led to a study of such systems from the viewpoint of game theory, focusing
on the inefficiency of stable outcomes. Traditionally, “stable outcomes” have been associated with pure
Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. The notions of price of anarchy [22] and price of stability [2]
provide natural measures of the system degradation, by capturing the degradation of the worst and best
Nash equilibria, respectively, compared to the socially optimal outcome.
However, the predictive power of such bounds has been questioned on (at least) two grounds:
1. The adoption of Nash equilibria as a prescriptive solution concept implicitly assumes that players
are able to reach such equilibria. In particular in light of several known hardness results for finding
Nash equilibria, this assumption is very suspect for computationally bounded players. In response,
recent work has begun analyzing the outcomes of natural response dynamics [7, 8, 33], as well as more
permissive solution concepts such as correlated or coarse correlated equilibria [3, 18, 34]. This general
direction of inquiry has become known as “robust price of anarchy”.
2. The assumption that players seek only to maximize their own utility is at odds with altruistic behavior
routinely observed in the real world. While modeling human incentives and behavior accurately is
a formidable task, several papers have proposed natural models of altruism [23, 24] and analyzed its
impact on the outcomes of games [11, 12, 13, 15].
The goal of this paper is to begin a thorough investigation of the effects of relaxing both of the standard
assumptions simultaneously, i.e., considering the combination of weaker solution concepts and notions of
partially altruistic behavior by players. In Section 2, we formally define the altruistic extension of an n-
player game in the spirit of past work on altruism (see [23, p. 154] and [20, 12]): player i has an associated
altruism parameter αi, and player i’s cost (or payoff) is a convex combination of (1 − αi) times his direct
cost (or payoff) and αi times the social cost (or social welfare). By tuning the parameters αi, this model
allows smooth interpolation between pure selfishness (αi = 0) and pure altruism (αi = 1).
In order to analyze the degradation of system performance in light of partially altruistic behavior, we
extend the notion of robust price of anarchy [33] to altruistic extensions, and show that a suitably adapted
notion of smoothness [33] captures the properties of a system that determine its robust price of anarchy.
We use this framework to analyze three classes of games:
1. In a cost-sharing game [2], players choose subsets of resources, and all players choosing the same
resource share its cost evenly. Thus, cost-sharing games model scenarios in which individual players
have an interest in building infrastructure, and can share the cost of infrastructure that benefits several
of the players. Using our framework, we derive a bound of n/(1 − αˆ) on the robust price of anarchy
of these games, where αˆ is the maximum altruism level of a player. This bound is tight for uniformly
altruistic players.
2. In utility games [35], players choose subsets of resources and derive utility of the chosen set. The total
welfare is determined by a submodular function of the union of all chosen sets. Utility games thus
model scenarios in which different players build infrastructure with different objectives, and the lack
of coordination may be societally suboptimal. We derive a bound of 2 on the robust price of anarchy
of these games. In particular, the bound remains at 2 regardless of the (possibly different) altruism
levels of the players. This bound is tight.
3. We revisit and extend the analysis of atomic congestion games [32], in which players choose subsets of
resources whose costs increase (linearly) with the number of players using them. Thus, they are natural
models of traffic on roads or in computer networks as well as scheduling on machines, where selfish
choices can lead to overcongestion of resources which would be much faster if used in moderation.
Caragiannis et al. [11] recently derived a tight bound of (5 + 4α)/(2 + α) on the pure price of anarchy
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when all players have the same altruism level α.1 Our framework makes it an easy observation that their
proof in fact bounds the robust price of anarchy. We generalize their bound to the case when different
players have different altruism levels, obtaining a bound in terms of the maximum and minimum
altruism levels. This partially answers an open question from [11]. For the special case of symmetric
singleton congestion games (which corresponds to selfish scheduling on machines), we extend our study
of non-uniform altruism and obtain an improved bound of (4 − 2α)/(3 − α) on the price of anarchy
when an α-fraction of the players are entirely altruistic and the remaining players are entirely selfish.
Notice that many of these bounds on the robust price of anarchy reveal a counter-intuitive trend: at best,
for utility games, the bound is independent of the level of altruism, and for congestion games and cost-sharing
games, it actually increases in the altruism level, unboundedly so for cost-sharing games. Intuitively, this
phenomenon is explained by the fact that a change of strategy by player i may affect many players. An
altruistic player will care more about these other players than a selfish player; hence, an altruistic player
accepts more states as “stable”. This suggests that the best stable solution can also be chosen from a larger
set, and the price of stability should thus decrease. Our results on the price of stability lend support to
this intuition: for congestion games, we derive an upper bound on the price of stability which decreases as
2/(1+α); similarly, for cost-sharing games, we establish an upper bound which decreases as (1−α)Hn +α.
The increase in the price of anarchy is not a universal phenomenon, demonstrated by symmetric singleton
congestion games. Caragiannis et al. [11] showed a bound of 4/(3+α) for pure Nash equilibria with uniformly
altruistic players, which decreases with the altruism level α. Our bound of (4 − 2α)/(3 − α) for mixtures
of entirely altruistic and selfish players is also decreasing in the fraction of entirely altruistic players. We
also extend an example of Lu¨cking et al. [25] to show that symmetric singleton congestion games may have
a mixed price of anarchy arbitrarily close to 2 for arbitrary altruism levels. In light of the above bounds,
this establishes that pure Nash equilibria can result in strictly lower price of anarchy than weaker solution
concepts.
Related Work. Much of our analysis is based on extensions of the notion of smoothness as proposed
by Roughgarden [33] (see Section 2.2). The basic idea is to bound the sum of cost increases of individual
players switching strategies by a combination of the costs of two states. Because these types of bounds
capture local improvement dynamics, they bound the price of anarchy not only for Nash equilibria, but also
more general solution concepts, including coarse correlated equilibria. The smoothness notion was recently
refined in the local smoothness framework by Roughgarden and Schoppmann [34]. They require the types of
bounds described above only for nearby states, thus obtaining tighter bounds, albeit only for more restrictive
solution concepts and convex strategy sets. Using the local smoothness framework, they obtained optimal
upper bounds for atomic splittable congestion games. Nadav and Roughgarden [28] showed that smoothness
bounds apply all the way to solution concepts called “average coarse correlated equilibrium,” but not beyond.
A comparison between the costs in worst-case outcomes under solution concepts of different generality
was recently undertaken by Bradonjic et al. [9] under the name “price of mediation:” specifically for the case
of symmetric singleton congestion games with convex latency functions, they showed that the ratio between
the most expensive correlated equilibrium and the most expensive Nash equilibrium can grow exponentially
in the number of players.
Hayrapetyan et al. [19] studied the impact of “collusion” in network congestion games, where players
form coalitions to minimize their collective cost. These coalitions are assumed to be formed exogeneously,
i.e., conceptually, each coalition is replaced by a “super-player” that acts on behalf of its members. The
authors show that collusion in network congestion games can lead to Nash equilibria that are inferior to
the ones of the collusion-free game (in terms of social cost). They also derive bounds on the the price of
anarchy caused by collusion. Note that the cooperation within each coalition can be interpreted as a kind of
“locally” altruistic behavior, i.e., each player only cares about the cost of the members of his coalition. In
a sense, the setting considered in [19] can therefore be regarded as being orthogonal to the viewpoint that
we adopt in this paper: in their setting, players are assumed to be entirely altruistic but locally attached to
1The altruism model of [11] differs from ours in a slight technicality discussed in Section 2 (Remark 1). Therefore, various
bounds we cite here are stated differently in [11].
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their coalitions. In contrast, in our setting, players may have different levels of altruism but locality does
not play a role.
Several recent studies investigate “irrational” player behavior in games; examples include studies on
malicious (or spiteful) behavior [5, 10, 13, 21] and unpredictable (or Byzantine) behavior [8, 27, 31]. The
work that is most related to our work in this context is the one by Blum et al. [8]. The authors consider
repeated games in which every player is assumed to minimize his own regret. They derive bounds on the
inefficiency, called total price of anarchy, of the resulting outcomes for certain classes of games, including
congestion games and valid utility games. The exhibited bounds exactly match the respective price of anarchy
and even continue to hold if only some of the players minimize their regret while the others are Byzantine.
The latter result is surprising in the context of valid utility games because it means that the price of total
anarchy remains at 2, even if additional players are added to the game that behave arbitrarily. Our findings
allow us to draw an even more dramatic conclusion. Our bounds on the robust price of anarchy also extend
to the total price of anarchy of the respective repeated games (see Section 2.3). As a consequence, our result
for valid utility games implies that the price of total anarchy would remain at 2, even if the “Byzantine”
players were to act altruistically. That is, while the result in [8] suggests that arbitrary behavior does not
harm the inefficiency of the final outcome, our result shows that altruistic behavior does not help.
If players’ altruism levels are not uniform, then even the existence of pure Nash equilibria is not obvious.
Hoefer and Skopalik established it for several subclasses of atomic congestion games [20]; for the general-
ization of arbitrary player-specific cost functions, Milchtaich [26] showed existence for singleton congestion
games, and Ackermann et al. [1] for matroid congestion games, in which the strategy space of each player is
the basis of a matroid on the set of resources.
Models of Altruism. Models of altruism either identical or very similar to the one in this paper have
been studied in several papers. Perhaps the first published suggestion of a similar model is due to Ledyard
[23], but since then, different variations of it have been studied more extensively, e.g., [11, 12, 13, 15]. The
main difference is that in some of these models, linear combinations (rather than convex combinations) are
considered, e.g., with the selfish term having a factor of 1. For most of these variations, a straightforward
scaling of the coefficients shows equivalence with the model we consider here. The altruism model can
be naturally extended to include αi < 0, modeling spiteful behavior (see, e.g., [13]). While the modeling
extension is natural, several results in this and other papers do not continue to hold directly for negative αi.
Our model is strictly more general than some of the previous work in that the social cost function need not
be the sum of all players’ costs, but rather only needs to be bounded by the sum.
Besides models based on linear combinations of individual players’ costs (as well as social welfare), several
other approaches have been studied. Generally, altruism or other “other-regarding” social behavior has
received some attention in the behavioral economics literature (e.g., [17]). Alternative models of altruism
and spite have been proposed by Levine [24], Rabin [30] and Geneakoplos et al. [16]. These models are
designed more with the goal of modeling the psychological processes underlying spite or altruism (and
reciprocity): they involve players forming beliefs about other players. As a result, they are well-suited for
experimental work, but perhaps not as directly suited for the type of analysis in this paper.
2 Preliminaries
Let G = (N, {Σi}i∈N , {Ci}i∈N ) be a finite strategic game, where N = [n] is the set of players, Σi the
strategy space of player i, and Ci : Σ → R the cost function of player i, mapping every strategy profile
s ∈ Σ = Σ1 × · · · × Σn to the player’s direct cost. Unless stated otherwise, we assume that every player
i wants to minimize his individual cost function Ci. We also call such games cost-minimization games. A
social cost function C : Σ → R maps strategies to social costs. We require that C is sum-bounded, that
is, C(s) ≤
∑n
i=1 Ci(s) for all s ∈ Σ. We study altruistic extensions of strategic games equipped with sum-
bounded social cost functions. Our definition is based on one used (among others) in [12], and similar to
ones given in [11, 13, 23].
3
Definition 1 (Altruistic extension). Let α ∈ [0, 1]n. The α-altruistic extension of G (or simply α-altruistic
game) is defined as the strategic game Gα = (N, {Σi}i∈N , {Cαi }i∈N ), where for every i ∈ N and s ∈ Σ,
Cαi (s) = (1− αi)Ci(s) + αiC(s).
Thus, the perceived cost that player i experiences is a convex combination of his direct (selfish) cost and
the social cost; we call such a player αi-altruistic.
2 When αi = 0, player i is entirely selfish; thus, α = 0
recovers the original game. A player with αi = 1 is entirely altruistic. Given an altruism vector α ∈ [0, 1]n,
we let αˆ = maxi∈N αi and αˇ = mini∈N αi denote the maximum and minimum altruism levels, respectively.
When αi = α (a scalar) for all i, we call such games uniformly α-altruistic games.
Remark 1. In a recent paper, Caragiannis et al. [11] model uniformly altruistic players by defining the
perceived cost of player i as (1− ξ)Ci(s) + ξ(C(s)−Ci(s)), where ξ ∈ [0, 1]. It is not hard to see that in the
range ξ ∈ [0, 12 ] this definition is equivalent to ours by setting α = ξ/(1− ξ) or ξ = α/(1 + α).
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The altruistic extension of a payoff-maximization game, in which players seek to maximize their payoff
functions {Πi}i∈N , with a social welfare function Π is defined analogously to Definition 1; the only difference
is that every player i wants to maximize Παi instead of minimizing C
α
i here.
2.1 Equilibrium Concepts
We study the inefficiency of equilibria in altruistic extensions of various games. The most general equilibrium
concept that we will deal with is the following one.
Definition 2 (Coarse equilibrium). A coarse equilibrium (or coarse correlated equilibrium) of a game G is
a probability distribution σ over Σ = Σ1 × · · · × Σn with the following property: if s is a random variable
with distribution σ, then for each player i, and all s∗i ∈ Σi:
Es∼σ [Ci(s)] ≤ Es−i∼σ−i [Ci(s
∗
i , s−i)] , (1)
where σ−i is the projection of σ on Σ−i = Σ1 × · · · × Σi−1 × Σi+1 × · · · × Σn.
The set of all coarse equilibria is also known as the Hannan Set (see, e.g., [36]). It includes several other
solution concepts, such as correlated equilibria, mixed Nash equilibria and pure Nash equilibria. We briefly
review these equilibrium notions.
Informally, the difference between a coarse equilibrium and a correlated equilibrium is the following: in a
coarse equilibrium, it is required that a player “adheres” to s when he is informed of the distribution σ from
which s is drawn. In a correlated equilibrium, a player is only required to adhere to s when he is informed
of the distribution σ as well as the strategy that has been drawn for him, i.e., that he will play under s.
A mixed Nash equilibrium is a coarse equilibrium whose distribution σ is the product of independent
distributions σ1, . . . , σn for the players. Thus, any mixed Nash equilibrium is also a correlated equilibrium.
A pure Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile s such that for each player i, Ci(s) ≤ Ci(s∗i , s−i) for all s
∗
i ∈ Σi.
A pure Nash equilibrium is a special case of a mixed Nash equilibrium where the support of σi has cardinality
1 for all i.
We use PNE(G), MNE(G), CE(G), and CCE(G), to denote the set of pure Nash equilibria, mixed Nash
equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse equilibria of a game G, respectively.
The price of anarchy [22] and price of stability [2] are natural ways of quantifying the inefficiency of
equilibria for classes of games:
2We note that the altruistic part of an individual’s perceived cost does not recursively take other players’ perceived cost into
account. Such recursive definitions of altruistic utility have been studied, e.g., by Bergstrom [6], and can be reduced to our
definition under suitable technical conditions.
3The model of [11] with ξ ∈ ( 1
2
, 1] has players assign strictly more weight to others than to themselves, a possibility not
present in our model since we consider altruism to be caring about others’ costs at most as much as about one’s own cost.
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Definition 3 (Price of anarchy, price of stability). Let S ⊆ Σ be a set of strategy profiles for a cost-
minimization game G with social cost function C, and let s∗ be a strategy profile that minimizes C. We
define
PoA(S,G) = sup
{
C(s)
C(s∗)
: s ∈ S
}
and PoS(S,G) = inf
{
C(s)
C(s∗)
: s ∈ S
}
.
The coarse (respectively correlated, mixed, pure) price of anarchy of a class of games G is defined as
sup{PoA(SG, G) : G ∈ G}, (2)
where SG = CCE(G) (respectively CE(G), MNE(G), PNE(G)). The coarse (respectively correlated, mixed,
pure) price of stability of a class of games is defined analogously, i.e., by replacing PoA by PoS in (2).
Notice that the price of anarchy and price of stability are defined with respect to the original social cost
function C, not accounting for the altruistic components. This reflects our desire to understand the overall
performance of the system (or strategic game), which is not affected by different perceptions of costs by
individuals. Note, however, that if all players have a uniform altruism level αi = α ∈ [0, 1] and the social
cost function C is equal to the sum of all players’ individual costs, then for every strategy profile s ∈ Σ,
Cα(s) = (1 − α + αn)C(s), where Cα(s) =
∑
i∈N C
α
i (s) denotes the sum of all players’ perceived costs. In
particular, bounding the price of anarchy with respect to C is equivalent to bounding the price of anarchy
with respect to total perceived cost Cα in this case.
We extend Definition 3 in the obvious way to payoff-maximization games G with social welfare function
Π by considering the ratio Π(s∗)/Π(s), where s∗ refers to a strategy profile maximizing Π.
2.2 Smoothness
Many proofs bounding the price of anarchy for specific games (e.g., [32, 35]) use the fact that deviating from
an equilibrium to the strategy at optimum is not beneficial for any player. The addition of these inequalities,
combined with suitable properties of the social cost function, then gives a bound on the equilibrium’s
cost. Roughgarden [33] recently captured the essence of this type of argument with his definition of (λ, µ)-
smoothness of a game, thus providing a generic template for proving bounds on the price of anarchy. Indeed,
because such arguments only reason about local moves by players, they immediately imply bounds not only
for Nash equilibria, but all classes of equilibria defined in Section 2.1, as well as the outcomes of no-regret
sequences of play [8, 7]. Recent work has explored both the limits of this concept [28] and a refinement
requiring smoothness only in local neighborhoods [34]. The latter permits more fine-grained analysis of
games, but applies only to correlated equilibria and their subclasses.
In extending the definition of smoothness to altruistic games, we have to exercise some care. Simply
applying Roughgarden’s definition to the new game does not work, as the social cost function we wish to
bound is the sum of all direct costs without consideration of the altruistic component. Thus, with respect to
the social cost, altruistic games are in general not sum-bounded. For this reason, we propose a slightly revised
definition of (λ, µ, α)-smoothness ; the bulk of this paper is devoted to showing that with the definition, many
useful properties of Roughgarden’s definition are preserved.
For notational convenience, we define C−i(s) = C(s) − Ci(s) ≤
∑
j 6=i Cj(s). Note that when the social
cost is the sum of all players’ costs, the inequality is an equality.
Definition 4 ((λ, µ, α)-smoothness). Let Gα be a α-altruistic extension of a game with sum-bounded social
cost function C. Gα is (λ, µ, α)-smooth iff for any two strategy profiles s, s∗ ∈ Σ,
n∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) + αi(C−i(s
∗
i , s−i)− C−i(s)) ≤ λC(s
∗) + µC(s). (3)
For α = 0, this definition coincides with Roughgarden’s notion of (λ, µ)-smoothness. To gain some
intuition, consider two strategy profiles s, s∗ ∈ Σ, and a player i ∈ N who switches from his strategy si
under s to s∗i , while the strategies of the other players remain fixed at s−i. The contribution of player i to
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the left-hand side of (3) then accounts for the individual cost that player i perceives after the switch plus αi
times the difference in social cost caused by this switch exluding player i. The sum of these contributions
needs to be bounded by λC(s∗) + µC(s). We will see that this definition of (λ, µ, α)-smoothness allows us
to quantify the price of anarchy of some large classes of altruistic games with respect to the very broad class
of coarse correlated equilibria.
2.3 Preliminary Results
We first show that many of the results in [33] following from (λ, µ)-smoothness carry over to our altruistic
setting using the extended (λ, µ, α)-smoothness notion (Definition 4). Even though some care has to be
taken in extending these results, most of the proofs of the propositions in this section follow along similar
lines as their analogues in [33].
Proposition 1. Let Gα be a α-altruistic game. If Gα is (λ, µ, α)-smooth with µ < 1, then the coarse (and
thus correlated, mixed, and pure) price of anarchy of Gα is at most λ1−µ .
Proof. Let σ be a coarse equilibrium of Gα, s a random variable with distribution σ, and s∗ ∈ Σ an arbitrary
strategy profile. The coarse equilibrium condition implies that for every player i ∈ N :
E [(1− αi)Ci(s) + αiC(s)] ≤ E [(1− αi)Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) + αiC(s
∗
i , s−i)] .
By linearity of expectation, for every player i ∈ N :
E [Ci(s)] ≤ E [Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) + αi(C(s
∗
i , s−i)− Ci(s
∗
i , s−i))− αi(C(s) − Ci(s))] .
By summing over all players and using linearity of expectation, we obtain
E [C(s)] ≤ E
[
n∑
i=1
Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) + αi(C−i(s
∗
i , s−i)− C−i(s))
]
.
Now we use the smoothness property (3) to conclude
E [C(s)] ≤ E [λC(s∗) + µC(s)] = λC(s∗) + µE [C(s)] .
Solving for E [C(s)] now proves the claim. As coarse equilibria include correlated equilibria, mixed Nash
equilibria and pure Nash equilibria, the correlated, mixed, and pure price of anarchy are thus also bounded
by λ1−µ .
As we show later, for many important classes of games, the bounds obtained by (λ, µ, α)-smoothness
arguments are actually tight, even for pure Nash equilibria. Therefore, as in [33], we define the robust price
of anarchy as the best possible bound on the coarse price of anarchy obtainable by a (λ, µ, α)-smoothness
argument.
Definition 5. The robust price of anarchy of a α-altruistic game Gα is defined as
RPoAG(α) = inf
{
λ
1−µ : G
α is (λ, µ, α)-smooth, µ < 1
}
.
For a class G of games, we define RPoAG(α) = sup {RPoAG(α) : G ∈ G}. We omit the subscript when the
game (or class of games) is clear from the context.
The smoothness condition also proves useful in the context of no-regret sequences and the price of total
anarchy, introduced by Blum et al. [8].
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Proposition 2. Let s∗ be a strategy profile minimizing the social cost function C of an α-altruistic game
Gα, and s1, . . . , sT a sequence of strategy profiles in which every player i ∈ N experiences vanishing average
external regret, i.e.,
T∑
t=1
Cαi (s
t) ≤
(
min
s′
i
∈Σi
T∑
t=1
Cαi (s
′
i, s
t
−i)
)
+ o(T ).
The average cost of this sequence of T strategy profiles then satisfies
1
T
T∑
t=1
C(st) ≤ RPoA(α) · C(s∗) as T →∞.
Proof. Consider a sequence s1, . . . , sT of strategy profiles of an α-altruistic game Gα that is (λ, µ, α)-smooth
with µ < 1. For every i ∈ N and t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, define
δαi (s
t) = Cαi (s
t)− Cαi (s
∗
i , s
t
−i).
Let ∆(st) =
∑n
i=1 δ
α
i (s
t). We have
∆(st) =
n∑
i=1
Cαi (s
t)− Cαi (s
∗
i , s
t
−i)
=
n∑
i=1
(
(1− αi)Ci(s
t) + αiC(s
t)−
(
(1− αi)Ci(s
∗
i , s
t
−i) + αiC(s
∗
i , s
t
−i)
))
= C(st)−
n∑
i=1
(
Ci(s
∗
i , s
t
−i) + αi(C−i(s
∗
i , s
t
−i)− C−i(s
t))
)
.
Exploiting the (λ, µ, α)-smoothness property, we obtain
C(st) ≤ λ1−µC(s
∗) + 11−µ∆(s
t). (4)
Suppose that s1, . . . , sT is a sequence of strategy profiles in which every player experiences vanishing average
external regret, i.e.,
T∑
t=1
Cαi (s
t) ≤
(
min
s′
i
∈Σi
T∑
t=1
Cαi (s
′
i, s
t
−i)
)
+ o(T ).
We obtain that for every player i ∈ N :
1
T
T∑
t=1
δαi (s
t) ≤
1
T
(
T∑
t=1
Cαi (s
t)− min
s′
i
∈Σi
T∑
t=1
Cαi (s
′
i, s
t
−i)
)
= o(1).
Using this inequality and (4), we obtain that the average cost of the sequence of T strategy profiles is
1
T
T∑
t=1
C(st) ≤
λ
1− µ
C(s∗) +
1
1− µ
n∑
i=1
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
δαi (s
t)
)
T→∞
−→
λ
1− µ
C(s∗).
Roughgarden [33, Proposition 2.6] shows that for games that have an underestimating exact potential
function, best response dynamics4 converge rapidly to a strategy profile of social cost close to the robust
4Best response dynamics are a natural way of searching for a pure Nash equilibrium: if the current strategy profile is not a
Nash equilibrium, then pick a player who can improve his cost and change his strategy to one that minimizes his cost.
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price of anarchy times the optimum social cost of the game; see [33] for a precise statement of this result
and the accompanying definitions. Proposition 2.6 in [33] and its proof straightforwardly carry over to
(λ, µ, α)-smooth games that have such an underestimating exact potential function.
The results in this section continue to hold for altruistic extensions of payoff-maximization games if we
adapt Definition 4 as follows. Let Gα be an α-altruistic extension of a payoff-maximization game with social
welfare function Π. Define Π−i(s) = Π(s)− Πi(s). Gα is (λ, µ, α)-smooth iff for every two strategy profiles
s, s∗ ∈ Σ,
n∑
i=1
(Πi(s
∗
i , s−i) + αi(Π−i(s
∗
i , s−i)−Π−i(s))) ≥ λΠ(s
∗)− µΠ(s). (5)
Given this smoothness definition, all the results above hold when we replace λ1−µ by
1+µ
λ
and µ < 1 by
µ > −1 in Definition 5.
3 Fair Cost-sharing Games
A fair cost-sharing game G = (N,E, {Σi}i∈N , {ce}e∈E) is characterized by a set E of resources (or facilities),
and strategy sets Σi ⊆ 2E ; that is, players’ strategies si ∈ Σi are subsets of resources. Given a strategy
profile s ∈ Σ = Σ1 × · · · × Σn, we define xe(s) = |{i ∈ N : e ∈ si}| as the number of players that use
resource e ∈ E under s. Let U(s) be the set of resources that are used under s, i.e., U(s) =
⋃
i∈N si. Each
facility e ∈ E has a cost ce which is evenly shared by all players using e, i.e., the direct cost of player i is
Ci(s) =
∑
e∈si
ce/xe(s). The social cost function is C(s) =
∑n
i=1 Ci(s) =
∑
e∈U(s) ce.
It is well-known that the pure price of anarchy of fair cost-sharing games is n [29]. We show that it can
get significantly worse in the presence of altruistic players: the following theorem gives a much worse upper
bound, which we subsequently show to be tight.
Theorem 3. The robust price of anarchy of α-altruistic cost-sharing games is at most n1−αˆ (with n/0 =∞).
Proof. The claim is true for αˆ = 1 because RPoA(α) ≤ ∞ holds trivially. We show that Gα is (n, αˆ, α)-
smooth for αˆ ∈ [0, 1). Let s and s∗ be two strategy profiles. Fix an arbitrary player i ∈ N . We have
C(s∗i , s−i)− C(s) =
∑
e∈U(s∗
i
,s−i)
ce −
∑
e∈U(s)
ce ≤
∑
e∈s∗
i
\U(s)
ce.
We use this inequality to obtain the following bound:
(1 − αi)Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) + αi(C(s
∗
i , s−i)− C(s)) ≤ (1− αi)
∑
e∈s∗
i
ce
xe(s∗i , s−i)
+ αi
∑
e∈s∗
i
\U(s)
ce
xe(s∗i , s−i)
≤
∑
e∈s∗
i
ce
xe(s∗i , s−i)
≤
∑
e∈s∗
i
n · ce
xe(s∗)
.
The first inequality holds because xe(s
∗
i , s−i) = 1 for every e ∈ s
∗
i \U(s), and the last inequality follows from
xe(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ xe(s
∗)/n for every e ∈ s∗i . The left-hand side of the smoothness condition (3) is equivalent to
n∑
i=1
((1− αi)Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) + αi(C(s
∗
i , s−i)− C(s)) + αiCi(s)) ≤
n∑
i=1

∑
e∈s∗
i
n · ce
xe(s∗)

+ αˆC(s)
= nC(s∗) + αˆC(s).
We conclude that the robust price of anarchy is at most n1−αˆ . Example 1 shows that this bound is tight,
even for pure Nash equilibria.
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Example 1. Consider the cost-sharing game in which n players can choose between two different facilities
e1 and e2 of cost 1 and n/(1−α), respectively. Let s∗ = (e1, . . . , e1) and s = (e2, . . . , e2) refer to the strategy
profiles in which every player chooses e1 and e2, respectively. Then C(s
∗) = 1 and C(s) = n/(1− α). Note
that s is a pure Nash equilibrium of the α-altruistic extension of this game because for every player i we
have
(1− α)Ci(s) + αC(s) = 1 + α
n
1− α
= Cαi ({e1}, s−i).
The pure price of anarchy is therefore at least n/(1− α).
We turn to the pure price of stability of uniformly α-altruistic cost-sharing games. Clearly, an upper
bound on the pure price of stability extends to the mixed, correlated and coarse price of stability. As opposed
to the price of anarchy, the price of stability does improve with increased altruism. The proof of the following
proposition exploits a standard technique to bound the pure price of stability of exact potential games (see,
e.g., [29]).
Proposition 4. The pure price of stability of uniformly α-altruistic cost-sharing games is at most (1 −
α)Hn + α.
Proof. Let Gα be a uniformly α-altruistic cost-sharing game. It is not hard to verify that Gα is an exact
potential game with potential function Φα(s) = (1 − α)Φ(s) + αC(s), where Φ(s) =
∑
e∈E
∑xe(s)
i=1 ce/i.
Observe that
Φα(s) = (1− α)
∑
e∈E
xe(s)∑
i=1
ce
i
+ α
∑
e∈U(s)
ce ≤ ((1 − α)Hn + α)
∑
e∈U(s)
ce = ((1− α)Hn + α)C(s).
We therefore have that C(s) ≤ Φα(s) ≤ ((1− α)Hn + α)C(s).
Let s be a strategy profile that minimizes Φα, and let s∗ be an optimal strategy profile that minimizes
the social cost function C. Note that s is a pure Nash equilibrium of Gα. We have
C(s) ≤ Φα(s) ≤ Φα(s∗) ≤ ((1− α)Hn + α)C(s
∗),
which proves the claim.
4 Valid Utility Games
A valid utility game [35] is a payoff maximization game given by G = (N,E, {Σi}i∈N , {Πi}i∈N , V ), where E
is a ground set of resources, the strategy sets Σi are subsets of E, Πi is the payoff function of player i, and
V is a submodular5 and non-negative function on E. Every player strives to maximize his individual payoff
function Πi.
For a strategy profile s ∈ Σ, let U(s) =
⋃
i∈N si ⊆ E be the union of all players’ strategies under s. The
social welfare function Π : Σ→ R to be maximized is Π(s) = V (U(s)), and thus depends only on the union
of the players’ chosen strategies, evaluated by V . The individual payoff functions of all players i ∈ N are
assumed to satisfy6 Πi(s) ≥ Π(s)−Π(∅, s−i) for every strategy profile s ∈ Σ. Intuitively, this means that the
individual payoff of a player is at least his contribution to the social welfare. Moreover, it is assumed that
Π(s) ≥
∑n
i=1 Πi(s) for every s ∈ Σ. See [35] for a detailed description and justification of these assumptions.
Examples of games falling into this framework include natural game-theoretic variants of the facility
location, k-median and network routing problems [35]. Vetta [35] proved a bound of 2 on the pure price of
anarchy for valid utility games with non-decreasing V , and Roughgarden showed in [33] how this bound is
achieved via a (λ, µ)-smoothness argument. We extend this result to altruistic extensions of these games.
5For a finite set E, a function f : 2E → R is submodular iff f(A∪{x})−f(A) ≥ f(B∪{x})−f(B) for any A ⊆ B ⊆ E, x ∈ E.
6We abuse notation and write Π(∅, s−i) to denote V (U(s)\si).
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Theorem 5. The robust price of anarchy of α-altruistic valid utility games is 2.
Note that in the statement above, α is a vector, i.e., the claim holds for arbitrary non-uniform altruism.
Proof. We show that the α-altruistic extension Gα of a valid utility game is (1, 1, α)-smooth.
Fix two strategy profiles s, s∗ ∈ Σ and consider an arbitrary player i ∈ N . By assumption, we have
Πi(s) ≥ Π(s)−Π(∅, s−i). Therefore, for each player i ∈ N ,
Π(s∗i , s−i)−Π(s) + Πi(s) = (Π(s
∗
i , s−i)−Π(∅, s−i))− (Π(s) −Π(∅, s−i)) + Πi(s)
≥ Π(s∗i , s−i)−Π(∅, s−i). (6)
Now let Ui =
⋃n
j=1 sj ∪
⋃i
j=1 s
∗
j . Summing over all i ∈ N ,
n∑
i=1
((1− αi)Πi(s
∗
i , s−i) + αi(Π(s
∗
i , s−i)−Π(s) + Πi(s))) ≥
n∑
i=1
(Π(s∗i , s−i)−Π(∅, s−i))
=
n∑
i=1
(V (U(s∗i , s−i))− V (U(s) \ si))
≥
n∑
i=1
(V (Ui)− V (Ui−1))
≥ Π(s∗)−Π(s).
Here, the first inequality follows from (6) and because Πi(s) ≥ Π(s) − Π(∅, s−i) for every i, the second
inequality holds because V is submodular, and the final inequality follows from V being non-decreasing. We
conclude that Gα is (1, 1, α)-smooth, which proves an upper bound of 2 on the robust price of anarchy. This
bound is tight, as shown by Example 2.
Example 2. Consider a valid utility game G with two players N = {1, 2}, a ground set E = {1, 2} of two
elements and strategy sets Σ1 = {{1}, {2}}, Σ2 = {∅, {1}}. Define V (S) = |S| for every subset S ⊆ E. Note
that V is non-negative, non-decreasing and submodular.
For a given strategy profile s ∈ Σ, the individual profits Π1(s) and Π2(s) of player 1 and player 2,
respectively, are defined as follows: Π1(s) = 1 for all strategy profiles s. Π2(s) = 1 if s = ({2}, {1}) and
Π2(s) = 0 otherwise. It is not hard to verify that for every player i and every strategy profile s ∈ Σ we have
Πi(s) ≥ Π(s) − Π(∅, s−i). Moreover, Π(s) ≥ Π1(s) + Π2(s) for every s ∈ Σ. We conclude that G is a valid
utility game.
Let α ∈ [0, 1]2, and consider the α-altruistic extension Gα of G. We claim that s = ({1}, ∅) is a pure
Nash equilibrium of Gα: the profit of player 1 under s is (1−α1)+α1 = 1. His profit remains 1 if he switches
to strategy {2}. The profit of player 2 under s is α2. If he switches to strategy {1}, then his profit is α2 as
well. Thus, s is a pure Nash equilibrium. Since Π(s) = 1 and Π(({2}, {1})) = 2, the pure price of anarchy
of G is 2.
5 Congestion Games
In an atomic congestion game G = (N,E, {Σi}i∈N , {de}e∈E), players’ strategies are again subsets of facilities,
Σi ⊆ 2E. Each facility e ∈ E has an associated delay function de : N → R. As in Section 3, we write
xe(s) for the number of players using facility e. Player i’s cost is Ci(s) =
∑
e∈si
de(xe(s)), and the social
cost is C(s) =
∑n
i=1 Ci(s). We focus on linear congestion games, i.e., the delay functions are of the form
de(x) = aex+be, where ae, be are non-negative rational numbers. Pure Nash equilibria of altruistic extensions
of linear congestion games always exist [20]; this may not be the case for arbitrary (non-linear) congestion
games.
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The PoA of linear congestion games is known to be 52 [14]. Recently, Caragiannis et al. [11] extended this
result to linear congestion games with uniformly altruistic players. Applying the transformation outlined in
Remark 1, their result can be stated as follows:
Theorem 6 (Caragiannis et al. [11]). The pure price of anarchy of uniformly α-altruistic linear congestion
games is at most 5+4α2+α .
The proof in [11] implicitly uses a smoothness argument in the framework we define here for altruistic
games. Thus, without any additional work, our framework allows the extension of Theorem 6 to the robust
PoA. Caragiannis et al. [11] also showed that the bound of Theorem 6 is asymptotically tight. A simpler
example (given below) proves tightness of this bound (not only asymptotically). Thus, the robust price of
anarchy is exactly 5+4α2+α . We give a refinement of Theorem 6 to non-uniform altruism distributions, obtaining
a bound in terms of the maximum and minimum altruism levels.
Theorem 7. The robust price of anarchy of α-altruistic linear congestion games is at most 5+2αˆ+2αˇ2−αˆ+2αˇ .
As a first step, we show that without loss of generality, we can focus on simpler instances of linear
congestion games.
Lemma 8. Without loss of generality, all delay functions are of the form de(x) = x.
Proof. First, we may assume that for every delay function de, the ae and be coefficients are integers. This
can be ensured by multiplying all coefficients among all facilities by their least common multiple. In the
resulting game, all coefficients are integers, the price of anarchy is the same, and so is the set of all equilibria.
Next, we can assume that be = 0 for all e ∈ E. To show this, we replace any facility e ∈ E with delay
function d(x) = aex + be by n + 1 facilities e0, . . . , en with delay functions de0(x) = aex and dei(x) = bex
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We then adapt the strategy space Σi of each player i as follows: we replace every strategy
si ∈ Σi in which e occurs by the strategy si \ {e} ∪ {e0, ei}. There is an obvious bijection between the
strategy profiles in the original game and those in the new game, preserving the values of individual cost
functions and the social cost function. (Notice that this construction exploits the fact that all players have
unit weight, and would not carry over to weighted congestion games.)
Finally, for the same reason, we can also assume that ae = 1 for all e ∈ E. We replace e with facilities
e1, . . . , eae , each having delay function dei (x) = x, and adapt the strategy space Σi of each player i by
replacing each strategy si in which e occurs by si \ {e}∪ {e1, . . . , aae}. Now, all delay functions are de(x) =
x.
The next step in the proof of Theorem 7 is the following technical lemma:
Lemma 9. For every two non-negative integers x, y and αˆ, αˇ ∈ [0, 1] with αˆ ≥ αˇ,
((1 + αˆ)x+ 1)y + αˇ(1− x)x ≤
5 + 2αˆ+ 2αˇ
3
y2 +
1 + αˆ− 2αˇ
3
x2.
To prove this lemma, we make use of the following result:
Lemma 10. For all x, y ∈ N0, α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1], it holds that
((1 + α)x+ 1)y + βα(1 − x)x ≤ (2 + α− γ)y2 + γx2
for all γ ∈ [ 13 (1 + α− 2βα), 1 + α].
Proof. The inequality is equivalent to
((1 + α)x + 1)y + βα(1 − x)x− (2 + α)y2 ≤ γ(x2 − y2).
Assume that x = y. The inequality is then trivially satisfied because x ≤ x2 for all x ∈ N0. Next suppose
that x > y. Then
γ ≥
((1 + α)x + 1)y + βα(1 − x)x − (2 + α)y2
x2 − y2
.
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We show that the maximum of the expression on the right-hand side is attained by x = 2 and y = 1. First,
we fill in these values and conclude that for these values, γ ≥ 13 (1 + α − 2βα) ≥ 0. We now write x as
y + a, a ≥ 1, and rewrite the right-hand side as
f(y, a) =
(1 + α)y + βα
2y + a
+
(1 + βα)(y − y2)
a(2y + a)
− βα. (7)
Because we know that there are choices of x and a for which f(y, a) is positive (e.g., when y = 1 and a = 1),
and because a only occurs in the denominators, we know that (7) reaches its maximum when a = 1. So we
assume a = 1. When we then fill in y = 0, we see that f(0, 1) = 0, so f(1, 1) ≥ f(0, 1). When y > 1 we can
write y as w + 2, where w ≥ 0, and we can now further rewrite f(y, a) as
f(w + 2, 1) =
2α− 6βα
2w + 5
−
(2 − α+ 5βα)w + (1 + βα)w2
2w + 5
≤
2α− 6βα
2w + 5
.
When 2α− 6βα is negative, this term is certainly less than f(1, 1). When 2α− 6βα is positive, we have
f(w + 2, 1) ≤
2α− 6βα
2w + 5
≤
2α− 6βα
5
≤
1
3
(2α− 6βα) ≤
1
3
(1 + α− 2βα) = f(1, 1).
This shows that γ ≥ f(1, 1) = 13 (1 + α− 2βα).
The final case is when x < y. Then,
γ ≤
(2 + α)y2 − ((1 + α)x+ 1)y − βα(1 − x)x
y2 − x2
.
We show that the minimum of the expression on the right-hand side is attained by x = 0 and y = 1. First,
we fill in these values and conclude that for these values, γ ≤ 1 + α. We now write y as x + a, a ≥ 1, and
rewrite the right-hand side as
g(x, a) =
(1 + βα)x2 − (1 + a+ (a+ β)α)x − a
a(2x+ a)
+ 2 + α.
Suppose first that x = 0 and that a ≥ 2. Then we can write a as 1 + b, b > 0, and therefore
f(0, 1 + b) = 2 + α−
1
1 + b
≥
3
2
+ α ≥ 1 + α = f(0, 1).
When x ≥ 1, we can write x as 1 + b, b ≥ 0. We then have
f(1 + b, a) = 2 + α−
2 + α+ (1− α)b
2b+ 2 + a
+
(1 + βα)(b2 + b)
a(2b+ 2 + a)
.
The last of these terms is positive, hence
f(1 + b, a) ≥ 2 + α−
2 + α+ (1− α)b
2b+ 2 + a
≥ 2 + α−
2 + 1 + b
2b+ 2 + a
≥ 2 + α− 1 = 1 + α = f(0, 1).
This shows that γ ≤ f(0, 1) = 1 + α.
Now we can complete the proof of Lemma 9.
Proof of Lemma 9. Choose β ∈ [0, 1] such that αˇ = βαˆ. Using Lemma 10 above, we obtain
((1 + αˆ)x+ 1)y + αˇ(1 − x)x = ((1 + αˆ)x + 1)y + βαˆ(1 − x)x ≤ (2 + αˆ− γ)y2 + γx2,
where γ ∈ [ 13 (1 + αˆ− 2βαˆ), 1 + αˆ]. By choosing γ =
1
3 (1 + αˆ− 2βαˆ), we obtain
((1 + αˆ)x+ 1)y + αˇ(1− x)x ≤
5 + 2αˆ+ 2βαˆ
3
y2 +
1 + αˆ− 2βαˆ
3
x2.
Substituting βαˆ = αˇ yields the claim.
12
We remark that the choice of γ in the proof above has been made in order to minimize the expression
λ/(1− µ) (which is an increasing function in γ).
Lemma 9 is essentially the part that generalizes the proof in [11], and allows us to complete the proof of
Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 7. We show that the α-altruistic extension Gα of a linear congestion game is (13 (5 + 2αˆ+
2αˇ), 13 (1 + αˆ− 2αˇ), α)-smooth.
Let s and s∗ be two strategy profiles, and write xe = xe(s), x
∗
e = xe(s
∗). The left-hand side of the
smoothness condition (3) is equivalent to
n∑
i=1
((1− αi)Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) + αi(C(s
∗
i , s−i)− C(s)) + αiCi(s))
=
n∑
i=1

(1− αi)
( ∑
e∈s∗
i
\si
(xe + 1) +
∑
e∈si∩s∗i
xe
)
+ αi

 ∑
e∈s∗
i
\si
(2xe + 1) +
∑
e∈si\s∗i
(1− 2xe)

+ αiCi(s)


≤
n∑
i=1

∑
e∈s∗
i
((1 + αi)xe + 1) + αi
∑
e∈si
(1− xe)


≤
∑
e∈E
(((1 + αˆ)xe + 1)x
∗
e + αˇ(1− xe)xe) .
In the above derivation, the first inequality follows from the fact that (1−αi)xe ≤ (1+αi)xe+1+αi(1−2xe)
for every e ∈ si ∩ s
∗
i . Therefore, it is possible to simply replace all the (1 − αi)xe (in the third summation
operator of the left hand side of the first inequality) by (1+αi)xe+1+αi(1− 2xe), write Ci(s) as
∑
e∈si
xe,
and finally rewrite the resulting expression into the form of the right hand side of the first inequality. The
second inequality holds because for every i ∈ N and e ∈ si, 1 − xe ≤ 0 and by the definition of αˆ and αˇ.
The bound on the robust price of anarchy now follows from Lemma 9.
The following is a simple example that shows that the bound of 5+4α2+α on the robust price of anarchy for
uniformly α-altruistic linear congestion games is tight, even for pure Nash equilibria. It slightly improves the
lower bound example of [11], because it is simpler and it shows tightness of the bound not only asymptotically.
Example 3. Consider a game with six resources E = E1∪E2, E1 = {h0, h1, h2}, E2 = {g0, g1, g2} and three
α-altruistic players. The delay functions are given by de(x) = (1+α)x for e ∈ E1, and de(x) = x for e ∈ E2.
Each player i has two pure strategies: {hi−1, gi−1} and {h(i−2) (mod 3), hi (mod 3), gi (mod 3)}. The strategy
profile in which every player selects his first strategy is a social optimum of cost (1 + α) · 3 + 3 = (2 + α) · 3.
Consider the strategy profile s in which every player chooses his second strategy. We argue that s is a
Nash equilibrium. Each player’s perceived individual cost is c1 = (1−α)(4(1+α)+1)+α(5+4α) ·3, whereas
if a player unilaterally deviates to his first strategy, the new social cost would become (5 + 4α) · 3 + 1 − α.
Thus, the player’s new perceived individual cost is c2 = (1 − α)(3(1 + α) + 2) + α((5 + 4α) · 3 + 1 − α).
Because c1 = c2, s is a Nash equilibrium, of cost 4(1 + α) · 3 + 3 = (5 + 4α) · 3. We conclude that the price
of anarchy is at least 5+4α2+α for α ∈ [0, 1].
We turn to the pure price of stability of α-altruistic congestion games. Again, an upper bound on the
pure price of stability extends to the mixed, correlated and coarse price of stability.
Proposition 11. The pure price of stability of uniformly α-altruistic linear congestion games is at most
2
1+α .
Proof. Let Gα be a uniformly α-altruistic extension of a linear congestion game. It is not hard to verify
that Gα is an exact potential game with potential function Φα(s) = (1 − α)Φ(s) + αC(s), where Φ(s) =
13
∑
e∈E
∑xe(s)
i=1 i is Rosenthal’s potential function. Observe that
Φα(s) = (1 − α)
∑
e∈E
xe(s)∑
i=1
i+ αC(s) =
1− α
2
∑
e∈E
(x2e(s) + xe(s)) + α
∑
e∈E
x2e(s)
=
1 + α
2
C(s) +
1− α
2
∑
e∈E
xe(s).
We therefore have 1+α2 C(s) ≤ Φ
α(s) ≤ C(s). The claim now follows by using similar arguments as in which
proves the claim.
6 Symmetric Singleton Congestion Games
Symmetric singleton congestion games are an important special case of congestion games. They are defined
asG = (N,E, {Σi}i∈N , {de}e∈E): every player chooses one facility (also called edge) from E = {1, ...,m}, and
all strategy sets are identical, i.e., Σi = E for every i. We refer to these games simply as singleton congestion
games below. In singleton linear congestion games, the focus here, delay functions are also assumed to be
linear, of the form de(x) = aex+ be.
6.1 Uniform Altruism
Caragiannis et al. [11] prove the following theorem (stated using the transformation from Remark 1). It
shows that the pure price of anarchy does not always increase with the altruism level; the relationship
between α and the price of anarchy is thus rather subtle.
Theorem 12 (Caragiannis et al. [11]). The pure price of anarchy of uniformly α-altruistic singleton linear
congestion games is 43+α .
We show that even the mixed price of anarchy (and thus also the robust price of anarchy) will be at least
2 regardless of the altruism levels of the players, by generalizing a result of Lu¨cking et al. [25, Theorem 5.4].
This implies that the benefits of higher altruism in singleton congestion games are only reaped in pure Nash
equilibria, and the gap between the pure and mixed price of anarchy increases in α. Also it shows that
singleton congestion games constitute a class of games for which the smoothness argument cannot deliver
tight bounds.
Proposition 13. For every α ∈ [0, 1]n, the mixed price of anarchy for α-altruistic singleton linear congestion
games is at least 2.
Proof. Let m ≥ 2 and consider the instance with player set {1, . . . ,m} and facility set {1, . . . ,m}, with
de(x) = x (ae = 1 and be = 0) for each facility e. Denote by s the mixed strategy where each player
chooses each link with probability 1/m. When αi = 0 for every player, s is a mixed Nash equilibrium, and
E[C(s)] = 2m − 1 as proved in [25]. The optimum is clearly m, so the price of anarchy of this instance is
2− 1/m.
All that is left to show is that s is also a Nash equilibrium under arbitrary altruism levels. By symmetry,
it suffices to show that the expected cost of player 1 increases if he deviates to the strategy where he chooses
facility 1 with probability 1. Let s∗1 = 1. We have
E[Cα1 (s
∗
1, s−1)] = E[(1− α1)C1(s
∗
1, s−1) + α1C(s
∗
1, s−1)]
= (1− α1)E[C1(s
∗
1, s−1)] + α1E[C(s
∗
1, s−1)].
We already know that E[C1(s
∗
1, s−1)] ≥ E[C1(s)] because s is a Nash equilibrium when the players are
completely selfish, so we are done when we show E[C(s∗1, s−1)] ≥ E[C(s)] = 2m− 1.
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For an arbitrary pure strategy profile s, let Xi,e(s
′) be the indicator function that maps to 1 if player i
chooses facility e under s′, and 0 otherwise. Then it is clear that Ci(s
′) =
∑m
e=1Xi,e(s
′)de(s
′) for i = 1, . . . ,m,
and de(s) =
∑m
i=1Xi,e(s
′) for e = 1, . . . ,m. So Ci(s
′) =
∑m
e,j=1Xi,e(s
′)Xj,e(s
′). Using this last identity,
along with symmetry, independence, and linearity of expectation, the following derivation is easily made
(letting s′ = (s∗1, s−1)):
E[C(s∗1, s−1)] =
m∑
i=1
E[Ci(s
′)]
= E[C1(s
′)] + (m− 1)E[C2(s
′)]
= E[d1(s
′)] + (m− 1)
m∑
e,j=1
E[X2,e(s
′)Xj,e(s
′)]
=
m∑
i=1
E[Xi,1(s
′)] + (m− 1)

 m∑
j=1
E[X2,1(s
′)Xj,1(s
′)] + (m− 1)
m∑
j=1
E[X2,2(s
′)Xj,2(s
′)]


=
(
1 + (m− 1)
1
m
)
+ (m− 1)
(
1
m
+
1
m
+ (m− 2)
1
m2
+ (m− 1)
(
0 +
1
m
+ (m− 2)
1
m2
))
= 2m− 1.
6.2 Non-Uniform Altruism
We analyze the case when all altruism levels are in {0, 1}, i.e., each player is either completely altruistic or
completely selfish.7 Then, the system is entirely characterized by the fraction α of altruistic players (which
coincides with the average altruism level). The next theorem shows that in this case, too, the pure price of
anarchy improves with the overall altruism level.
Theorem 14. Assume that an α fraction of the players are completely altruistic, and the remaining (1−α)
fraction are completely selfish. Then, the pure price of anarchy of the altruistic singleton linear congestion
game is at most 4−2α3−α .
Let s be a pure Nash equilibrium of Gα and s∗ an optimal strategy profile. Again, let xe = xe(s) and
x∗e = xe(s
∗). Based on the strategy profile s, we partition the edges in E into sets E0, E1:
E1 = {e ∈ E : ∃i ∈ N with αi = 1 and si = {e}},
is the set of edges having at least one altruistic player, while E0 = E \ E1 is the set of edges that are used
exclusively by selfish players or not used at all. Let N1 and N0 refer to the respective player sets that are
assigned to E1 and E0. N1 may contain both altruistic and selfish players, while N0 consists of selfish players
only. Let k1 =
∑
e∈E1
xe and k0 = n− k1 denote the number of players in N1 and N0, respectively.
The high-level approach of our proof is as follows: We split the total cost C(s) of the pure Nash equilibrium
into C(s) = γC(s) + (1 − γ)C(s) for some γ ∈ [0, 1] such that γC(s) =
∑
e∈E0
xede(xe) and (1 − γ)C(s) =∑
e∈E1
xede(xe). We bound these two contributions separately to show that
3
4γC(s) + (1− γ)C(s) ≤ C(s
∗). (8)
The pure price of anarchy is therefore at most (34γ + (1− γ))
−1 = 44−γ . The bound then follows by deriving
an upper bound on γ in Lemma 18.
Lemma 15. Let s be a pure Nash equilibrium and assume that the delay functions (de)e∈E are semi-convex.
Then there is an optimal strategy profile s∗ such that xe(s) ≤ xe(s∗) for every edge e ∈ E1.
7This model relates naturally to Stackelberg scheduling games (see, e.g., [13]).
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Proof. Let s∗ be an optimal strategy profile, let xe denote xe(s), let x
∗
e denote xe(s
∗), and assume that
x∗e < xe for some e ∈ E1. Then there is some edge e¯ ∈ E with x
∗
e¯ > xe¯. Consider an altruistic player i ∈ N1
with si = {e}. (Note that i must exist by the definition of E1.) Because s is a pure Nash equilibrium, player
i has no incentive to deviate from e to e¯, i.e., C({e¯}, s−i) ≥ C(s), or, equivalently,
(xe¯ + 1)de¯(xe¯ + 1)− xe¯de¯(xe¯) ≥ xede(xe)− (xe − 1)de(xe − 1). (9)
Since x∗e < xe and xe¯ < x
∗
e¯ , the semi-convexity of the delay functions implies
(x∗e + 1)de(x
∗
e + 1)− x
∗
ede(x
∗
e) ≤ xede(xe)− (xe − 1)de(xe − 1), (10)
(xe¯ + 1)de¯(xe¯ + 1)− xe¯de¯(xe¯) ≤ x
∗
e¯de¯(x
∗
e¯)− (x
∗
e¯ − 1)de¯(x
∗
e¯ − 1). (11)
By combining (9), (10) and (11) and re-arranging terms, we obtain
(x∗e + 1)de(x
∗
e + 1) + (x
∗
e¯ − 1)de¯(x
∗
e¯ − 1) ≤ x
∗
ede(x
∗
e) + x
∗
e¯de¯(x
∗
e¯).
The above inequality implies that by moving a player j with s∗j = {e¯} from e¯ to e, we obtain a new strategy
profile s′ = ({e}, s∗−j) of cost C(s
′) ≤ C(s∗). (Note that j must exist because x∗e¯ > xe¯ ≥ 0.) Moreover, the
number of players on e under the new strategy profile s′ increased by one. We can therefore repeat the above
argument (with s′ in place of s∗) until we obtain an optimal strategy profile that satisfies the claim.
Note that Lemma 15 implies that at least for singleton congestion games, entirely altruistic players will
ensure that Nash equilibria are optimal.
Corollary 16. The pure price of anarchy of 1-altruistic extensions of symmetric singleton congestion games
with semi-convex delay functions is 1.
Henceforth, we assume that s∗ is an optimal strategy profile that satisfies the statement of Lemma 15.
Lemma 17. Define y∗ as y∗e = x
∗
e − xe ≥ 0 for every e ∈ E1, and y
∗
e = x
∗
e for all edges e ∈ E0. Then,∑
e∈E0
xede(xe) ≤
4
3
∑
e∈E y
∗
ede(x
∗
e).
Proof. Consider the game G¯ induced by Gα if all k1 players in N1 are fixed on the edges in E1 according
to s. Note that all remaining k0 = n − k1 players in N0 are selfish. That is, G¯ is a symmetric singleton
congestion game with player set N0, edge set E and delay functions (d¯e)e∈E , where d¯e(z) = de(xe + z) if
e ∈ E1 and d¯e(z) = de(z) for e ∈ E0. Let s¯ be the restriction of s to the players in N0, and define x¯ as x¯e = 0
for e ∈ E1 and x¯e = xe for e ∈ E0. It is not hard to verify that s¯ is a pure Nash equilibrium of the game G¯.
Let s¯∗ be a socially optimum profile for G¯, and for each edge e, let x¯∗e be the total number of players on e
under S¯∗. Then,
∑
e∈E0
xede(xe) =
∑
e∈E
x¯ed¯e(x¯e) ≤
4
3
∑
e∈E
x¯∗e d¯e(x¯
∗
e) ≤
4
3
∑
e∈E
y∗e d¯e(y
∗
e) =
4
3
∑
e∈E
y∗ede(x
∗
e),
where the first inequality follows from Theorem 12 and the second inequality follows from the optimality of
x¯∗.
Lemma 18. It holds that γ ≤ 2n0
n+n0
= 2(1−α)2−α .
Proof. The claim follows directly from Theorem 12 if N1 = ∅. Assume that N1 6= ∅, and let j ∈ N1 with
sj = {e¯}. Let C¯(s) =
∑
i∈N0
Ci(s)/k0 be the average cost experienced by players in N0. We first show
Cj(s) ≥
1
2 C¯(s). If N0 = ∅, then Cj(s) ≥
1
2 C¯(s) trivially holds. Suppose that N0 6= ∅, and let i ∈ N0 with
si = {e}. Recall that i is selfish. Because s is a Nash equilibrium, we have
Ci(s) = aexe + be ≤ ae¯(xe¯ + 1) + be¯ ≤ 2(ae¯xe¯ + be¯) = 2Cj(s).
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By summing over all k0 selfish players in N0, we obtain Cj(s) ≥
1
2 C¯(s) and thus
∑
j∈N1
Cj(s) ≥
1
2k1C¯(S).
We have
γ =
∑
i∈N0
Ci(s)∑
i∈N0
Ci(s) +
∑
j∈N1
Cj(s)
≤
k0C¯(S)
k0C¯(S) +
1
2k1C¯(S)
=
2k0
n+ k0
≤
2n0
n+ n0
,
where the last inequality follows because k0 ≤ n0.
Proof of Theorem 14. Using the above lemmas, we can show that the relation in (8) holds:
3
4
γC(s) + (1− γ)C(s) =
3
4
∑
e∈E0
xede(xe) +
∑
e∈E1
xede(xe) ≤
∑
e∈E
y∗ede(x
∗
e) +
∑
e∈E1
xede(xe)
=
∑
e∈E
x∗ede(x
∗
e) +
∑
e∈E1
(xede(xe)− xede(x
∗
e)) ≤
∑
e∈E
x∗ede(x
∗
e) = C(s
∗),
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 17 and the last inequality follows from Lemma 15 and because
delay functions are monotone increasing. We conclude that the pure price of anarchy is at most(
3
4
γ + (1− γ)
)−1
=
4
4− γ
≤
4− 2α
3− α
.
The bound now follows from Lemma 18.
7 General Properties of Smoothness
For the game classes that we analyzed (with the exception of symmetric singleton congestion games), we
used (λ, µ, α)-smoothness as our main tool to derive bounds on the price of anarchy. In this section, we
provide some general results about (λ, µ, α)-smoothness.
Proposition 19. Suppose that G is a class of cost-minimization games equipped with sum-bounded social
cost functions. The set SG = {(λ, µ, α) : ∀G ∈ G, Gα is (λ, µ, α)-smooth} is convex.
Proof. Pick an arbitrary game G ∈ G. It suffices to show that SG = {(λ, µ, α) : Gα is (λ, µ, α)-smooth} is
convex, because the intersection of any collection of convex sets is always convex.
Let (λ1, µ1, α
1), (λ2, µ2, α
2) ∈ SG be two elements in SG, and pick an arbitrary γ ∈ [0, 1]. For all pairs
(s, s∗) of strategy profiles of G,
γ
n∑
i=1
(Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) + α
1
i (C−i(s
∗
i , s−i)− C−i(s))) + (1− γ)
n∑
i=1
(Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) + α
2
i (C−i(s
∗
i , s−i)− C−i(s)))
≤ γ(λ1C(s
∗) + µ1C(s)) + (1 − γ)(λ2C(s
∗) + µ2C(s)).
By rewriting both sides of the above inequality, we obtain
n∑
i=1
(Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) + (γα
1
i + (1 − γ)α
2
i )(C−i(s
∗
i , s−i)− C−i(s)))
≤ (γλ1 + (1− γ)λ2)C(s
∗) + (γµ1 + (1− γ)µ2)C(s).
We conclude that G is (γ(λ1, µ1, α
1) + (1− γ)(λ2, µ2, α2))-smooth. Therefore, SG is convex.
A natural question to ask is whether the robust price of anarchy is also a convex function of α. This turns
out not to be the case. For instance, the robust price of anarchy for uniformly α-altruistic congestion games is
5+4α
2+α (see Section 5), which is a non-convex function. However, we can prove a somewhat weaker statement:
For a subset S ⊆ Rn, we call a function f : S → R quasi-convex iff f(γx+ (1 − γ)y) ≤ max{f(x), f(y)} for
all γ ∈ [0, 1].
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Theorem 20. Let G be a class of games equipped with sum-bounded social cost functions. Then RPoAG(α)
is a quasi-convex function of α.
Proof. Let G ∈ G. We show that for any α1, α2 ∈ Rn and γ ∈ [0, 1],
RPoA(γα1 + (1− γ)α2) ≤ max{RPoA(α1),RPoA(α2)}.
Let (ǫ1, ǫ2, . . .) be a decreasing sequence of positive real numbers that tends to 0. Moreover, let
((λ1,1, µ1,1, α
1), (λ1,2, µ1,2, α
1), . . .) and ((λ2,1, µ2,1, α
2), (λ2,2, µ2,2, α
2), . . .)
be sequences of elements in SG (where SG is as defined in the proof of Proposition 19) such that
RPoA(α1) + ǫj =
λ1,j
1−µ1,j
and RPoA(α2) + ǫj =
λ2,j
1−µ2,j
for all j. By Proposition 19, we know that for all j,
n∑
i=1
(Ci(s
∗
i , s−i) + (γα
1
i + (1− γ)α
2
i )(C−i(s
∗
i , s−i)− C−i(s)))
≤ γ(λ1,jC(s
∗) + µ1,jC(s)) + (1 − γ)(λ2,jC(s
∗) + µ2,jC(s))
≤ max{λ1,jC(s
∗) + µ1,jC(s), λ2,jC(s
∗) + µ2,jC(s)}.
Hence,
RPoA(γα1 + (1− γ)α2) ≤ max
{
λ1,j
1− µ1,j
,
λ2,j
1− µ2,j
}
≤ max{RPoA(α1),RPoA(α2)}+ ǫj ,
for all j. By taking the limit as j goes to infinity, we conclude RPoA(γα1 + (1 − γ)α2) ≤
max{RPoA(α1),RPoA(α2)}, which proves the claim.
The quasi-convexity of RPoAG implies:
Corollary 21. The points α that minimize RPoAG(α) on the domain [0, 1]
n form a convex set. The set of
points α that maximize RPoAG(α) on the domain [0, 1]
n includes at least one point that is a 0-1 vector.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
One might not expect that there are games in which the price of anarchy is greater than 1 when α = 1.
This phenomenon is a lot less surprising when approached from a local search point-of-view, as this is
only equivalent to saying that there exist local optima in the objective function C with respect to the
neighborhood set obtained by taking all strategies obtained by single-player deviations from a given strategy
profile s. Nevertheless, it still seems to us rather surprising that the price of anarchy can get worse when
the altruism level α gets closer to 1. This phenomenon has been observed before, in [11]. The fact that the
price of anarchy does not necessarily get worse in all cases is exemplified by our analysis of the pure price of
anarchy in symmetric singleton congestion games.
The most immediate future directions include analyzing singleton congestion games with more general
delay functions than linear ones. While the price of anarchy of such functions increases (e.g., the price of
anarchy for polynomials increases exponentially in the degree [4, 14]), this also creates room for potentially
larger reductions due to altruism. Similarly, the characterization of the robust price of anarchy of altruistic
congestion games with more general delay functions (e.g., polynomials) is left for future work.
For games where the smoothness argument cannot give tight bounds, would a refined smoothness ar-
gument like local smoothness in [34] work? For symmetric singleton congestion games, this seems unlikely,
as the price of anarchy bounds are already different between pure and mixed Nash equilibria. It is also
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worth trying to apply the smoothness argument or its refinements to analyze the price of anarchy for other
dynamics in other classes of altruistic games, for example, (altruistic) network vaccination games [12], which
are known to not always possess pure Nash equilibria, or to find examples to see why smoothness-based
arguments do not work.
We have seen that the impact of altruism depends on the underlying game. It would be nice to identify
general properties that enable to predict whether a given game suffers from altruism or not. What is it
that makes valid utility game invariant to altruism? Furthermore, what kind of “transformations” (not just
altruistic extensions) might be applied to a strategic game such that the smoothness approach can still be
adapted to give (tight) bounds? More generally, while the existence of pure Nash equilibria has been shown
for singleton and matroid congestion games with player-specific latency functions [1, 26], the price of anarchy
(for pure Nash equilibria or more general equilibrium concepts) has not yet been addressed. Studying the
price of anarchy in such a general setting (in which our setting with altruism can be embedded) by either
smoothness-based techniques or other methods is undoubtedly intriguing.
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